Eliza Musaeva is a consultant for the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. Prior to this appointment, she served as the head of the Ingush-Chechen branch for the Human Rights Center “Memorial.” She also taught as an associate professor at the Chechen Pedagogical College, in the Department of Psychology. Ms. Musaeva received her Master’s Degree at the Chechen-Ingush State University, Department of Geography, and studied at the Moscow State Pedagogical University, Department of Psychology where she received her Ph.D. in Psychology.

Tanya Lokshina is the Chairperson of a Moscow-based human rights think-tank, Demos Center for Information and Research. Demos helps Russian civic society solve its most pressing problems in the fields of human rights and democracy. In recent years, her work has been largely focused on Chechnya. She has undertaken numerous field missions to the region and runs a column on the Northern Caucasus at one of Russia’s current affairs Internet media outlets, Polit.Ru. Additionally, she is the author of numerous publications in Russian and English on topics including the role of international organizations in the Chechen conflict, the effects of the fight against terror on human rights in Russia, and hate speech in Russian media. Her book “The Imposition of a Fake Political Settlement in the Northern Caucasus: The 2003 Chechen Presidential Election” received praise in Russia and in Europe. She was the recipient of the 2006 Andrei Sakharov Award “For Journalism as Civic Accomplishment.”

 

QUICK OVERVIEW:

1. General Introduction to relevant issues in Ingushetia
2. Detentions in North Ossetia
3. Military Troops in Ingushetia
4. Security Issues:
   
   1. Killings of ethnic Russians
   2. State of NGOs
5. Who is behind the attacks on the security forces?
6. Who are the rebels: Radicalization of the civilian population
7. Economic factors
8. Ingush president: Aushev vs. Zyazikov
9. International Community’s role
10. Links to the rest of the region
11. Is the situation created on purpose?
12. Russian or Caucasus trends

 

Q: Tell us please about the current atmosphere and developments in Ingushetia

Musaeva: When we talk about the North Caucasus today, it is important that we consider each individual republic separately. Situation in Chechnya differs from that in Dagestan, from that in Ingushetia or from that in North Ossetia.

As far as Ingushetia is concerned, the situation is multi faceted and very complicated.

Ingushetia is located between Chechnya - with all of its ongoing problems - on one side, and North Ossetia on the other. Relations with those two republics dictate much of what is going on in Ingushetia.

Relations with Chechnya:
Ingushetia accepted a large number of Chechen refugees during the Chechen wars. It was in fact the only republic to welcome refugees from Chechnya. That is one important factor for the current Ingush situation.

Another relevant factor are the well-known incidents of security forces coming in from the Chechen territory, kidnapping men in Ingushetia, and taking them back to Chechnya. When this happens, local Ingush authorities are helpless to do anything.

For instance in 2004 a man by the name of Medov, was kidnapped and taken back to Chechnya. The local Ingush police stopped the car he was being kidnapped in and found him in the trunk. They called for back up, and it arrived, but then they were told by their supperiors to let the kidnappers go together with the man in the trunk.

Relations with North Ossetia:
On the other side is North Ossetia, a republic with which Ingushetia has had a decades-long conflict. The last flare up took place in 1992 and since then nothing has been done to improve the situation. In other words, the inter-ethnic relations are still very strained. By that I mean that Ingush and North Ossetia children that reside in the same districts, do not go to schools together, they do not play together, adults to not talk to each other. In fact, there are areas of North Ossetia where Ingush are not allowed to enter. This has been the state of things since 1992.

It was under these circumstances that the Beslan school siege took place (September 2004), adding another layer of tension to the existing conflict. Among the terrorists involved in the siege were those of Ingush nationality. Needless to say, this created additional strong anti-Ingush sentiment among the North Ossetians.

Another aspect to consider, in these delicate relations between North Ossetia and Ingushetia, is that Ingush feel that Russia, in its role of the powerful federal center, sides with the North Ossetia. And, although one must discuss these things carefully, supposedly the North Ossetians also feel supported by the federal center.

With all these relations in mind, we must consider the following: Currently, in Ingushetia, a war against terror is being conducted. It is conducted using the “Chechen methods”. In other words, there are frequent instances of illegal detention that borderline kidnappings. People are detained and their families do not know what happened to them or who took them. They usually turn up and are registered at the SIZO (prison “Sledstvennyi Izolyator” = Investigating Ward) in the town of Vladikavkaz, in North Ossetia. There they are tortured. And when I say tortured, I don’t mean tortured like in Guantanamo. I mean that they are horribly tortured: electrocuted, forced to wear gasmasks, needles are stuck under their fingernails, they are sexual abused (these methods are not only used against the detainees but against their relatives as well). Under these conditions, the detainees agree to whatever charges and sign whatever documents are presented to them. During the process, they are not allowed to see their lawyers, except, in some cases, the layer on duty who works on the premises. And all of this takes place in North Ossetia’s city of Vladikavkaz, and is done by the representative of the federal prosecutor’s office.

Q: And why are these detainees taken out of Ingushetia and into North Osseita?

Musaeva: The official explanation is that they are taken to North Ossetia simply because there is no such facility in Ingushetia. But the real reason behind it is that this arrangement suits the authorities. In the report by human rights center Memorial, this mechanism is called the “conveyor of violence”. The process continues in the following manner: The person in question is tried, and the jury often decides that the accused is innocent, because the torture marks are so evident. If that happens, sometimes another kidnapping attempt take place.

There has been a case when kidnapping was attempted again, immediately after the court rendered the decision, in the very courthouse. It was the case of a man by the name Markoshvili. His attorney called Memorial and told them that he and his client are being surrounded by a group of people, while in the court building. In other words, that his client is being kidnapped again.

The jury still maintains some autonomy and independence in these court hearings in these regions. However, even if the accused is freed by jury’s decision, that does not guarantee his safety once he leaves the court.

The prosecutor’s office has made a motion to modify laws regarding jury proceedings in the Caucasus regions, in order to stop ¨criminals from being set free.¨ This type of general cynicism has prevailed in Ingushetia for several years now. But in the past 6 months to a year, the situation has drastically intensified and additional police force and military troops have now been stationed in the region.

 

Q: When did the additional troops get stationed in Ingushetia? When did the initial batch of troops come in?

Musaeva: Like in other parts of Russia, there are regularly troops stationed in the region permanently. But reinforcements have been sent over during the past six months or so. And since then, a few unexpected trends have developed:

Firstly, kidnappings and tortures by security forces have continued.

Secondly, a more worrisome trend has emerged – the rebel underground activities such as: attacks on and blowing up of local police and government personnel and infrastructure have intensified.

Finally, during the past nine months there we have witnessed a noticeable increase in the number of arbitrary executions, in public, carried out by people wearing masks. These crimes are mainly perpetrated by the federal security forces.

Lokshina:
Helplessness of the local police:
Whenever we try to address the local police regarding these special operations, we receive a frustrated response. The local police complain that they are not informed about the details nor warned about the planed operations. When they try to talk to the federal security forces or participate in these operations, they are refused. There is a definite tension between the local police and the federal services. However, ironically, it is usually the local police that get targeted by the rebels.

Q: Can you elaborate more on the security in the republic?

Musaeva: Local police has neither influence nor authority over the federal forces. The civilians feel very vulnerable and unprotected because they know there is no one to protect them. In addition there are other worrisome trends.

Killings of ethnic Russians:
There has been an increase in violence against ethnic Russian (and generally Russian speaking) population in Ingushetia, beginning with the murder of a Russian woman last spring. This is particularly interesting because the Russian population has been living in Ingushetia for a long time, and Ingush and Russians have traditionally had good neighborly relations. This new state of things in Ingushetia, where all of a sudden ethnic Russians are under attack, subject to violence and harassment, reminds me of the pre-war conditions for ethnic Russians in Chechnya. The exact same tension existed in Chechnya before the 1994 war.

Lokshina:
State of the NGOs:
At the same time, the human rights organizations are under severe pressure. There is one relatively strong local group that deals with disappearances. It is run by Magomed Muzolgov, whose brother was abducted several years ago, and that is what drew Magomed to this particular issue. The name of the organization is MASHR. They get checked all the time, one audit after another and Magomed receives threatening letters and phone calls. The organization is really desperate.

Another organization, run by Taisa Isaeva, with offices in both Chechnya and Ingushetia provides yet another example of difficulties NGOs face in this region. On one hand, they are being harassed by the Chechen authorities, who insist that criticisms of Ingushetia are acceptable, but criticisms of Chechnya will not be tolerated. On the other hand, the organization receives the same messages from the local Ingush authorities who insist that Kadyrov and Chechnya can be topics of discussion but Ingush authorities should be left alone. The NGO situation deteriorated after the death of Anna Politkovskaya. Many human rights defenders participated in the piquet and they were treated very roughly by the police.

Musaeva:
Necessary preparations before a bigger showdown:
All these factors combined, intensify the sense among the population that the war is imminent. If you ask me, these events in Ingushetia, serve a purpose of preparing the public opinion in Russia, and internationally. And they can be effective, especially considering the informational blockade and the limited audience that reads reports on the state of human rights in the North Caucasus. God knows what will happen under the excuse of delivering assistance to the peaceful people of Ingushetia from attacks by the terrorists. It can be any kind of a special punitive sweep operation that may result in any kind of arbitrary actions targeting the population. The public opinion will be prepared, the local police will be helpless to interfere, the general prosecutor’s office will turn a bind eye, human rights defenders will not be listened to – and the population knows very well how unprotected they are.

 

Q: Who, in your opinion, are the people that attack police and federal security services?

Lokshina: This is one of the most difficult questions, because we don’t know enough about them. What we do know is that ironically, as a result of the Chechen war being conducted as a counter-insurgency operation, other underground cells have sprung up in other areas of the Northern Caucasus. And I am not talking about Chechens groups only, or Ingush groups only, or groups of any specific ethnic group for that mater. I am talking about groups that unite individuals of different ethnicities working together. Some of these men are motivated by radical Islam; others by personal vendetta. Some might have had family members abducted, others might have been tortured themselves. Now they are a force to be recognized.

When incidents occur and violations are committed by people in masks, the local population suspects FSB to be the culprit, because they are convinced that rebels of Ingush origins would not act out against Ingush civilians. I don’t think this argument is necessarily legitimate, and I believe that it was developed by the terrorist underground.

I cannot say they are all terrorists, but the Islamic underground certainly has terrorist fraction within it.

Q: Can you tell us about the apparent trend of radicalization of the Ingush population?

Lokshina: One of the key reasons for the growing tensions in Ingushetia, at least, in my opinion, stems from the actions of the military troops -- the lawlessness and humiliation to which they subject the local population on a routine basis. For instance, in one of the recent special operations in the village of Ali-Yurt in Ingushetia, the troops used very similar techniques to those used in the Chechen wars. I particularly have in mind the mop-up operations. In this specific incident numerous people were treated very roughly, beaten-up, humiliated, including the elderly, very young boys and a pregnant woman. It was a complete nightmare.

The civilian population in Ingushetia has now entered a vicious cycle, and this is what that cycle looks like: Lets say that rebels organize an attack. The next day, security forces respond to this attack by conducting a special operation. Sometimes these operations are conducted jointly by the local police and federal forces, but in many cases local police are excluded. During these operations, almost as a rule, civilians are grossly mistreated. As a result, the public has developed sympathy for the rebels. Not because they actually support insurgency, but because on a human level they sympathize with the victims of federal forces. Siding with the rebels has become civilians´ way to protest. This is particularly true in the case of the young people. There is a growing level of sympathy for the insurgents in Ingushetia, among the younger generations. Probably partially also because young men are the main targets of these counter-terrorist operations.

Musaeva: Again, I repeat, not because they are sympathizing with radical or extremist ideology, but because they feel powerless to do anything else in response to violations committed against them and their loved ones by the security forces.

 

Q: Ingushetia is economically in very poor standing right now. Is there an economic element in the radicalization process?

Musaeva: It would be better if the security forces changed the way they treat the civilian population. It is the first and foremost a question of dignity. Just like it was for the Chechens at the beginning of the war in 1994. For the Ingush, the question of human dignity is much more important than the issue of economic development.

Lokshina: Of course, if the economic situation were to improve, it would lead to creation of jobs for young people and they in turn would have something else to occupy themselves with. Their current idleness certainly does not help the situation, as it gives them more time to react to these humiliating situations. But security is the first priority. That goes without saying.

 

Q: What are the main differences between Zyazikov and Aushev? Why is it that the security situation is so much worse now that Zyazikov is in power?

Musaeva: Aushev left on his own volition because the situation in the republic changed after Putin’s accession to power. At that time, Aushev realized that alone, he would not be able to save Ingushetia. He did leave under pressure, but he left on his own accord nevertheless. He knew that he would have to compromise his principles at the expense of people’s wellbeing; for that reason, he left. Zyazikov is Putin’s man. His presence in the republic is almost unnoticable. He puts no roadblocks to anything that comes from Moscow. He makes no protests.

Lokshina: Aushev, on the other hand, commanded a lot of power in Ingushetia. Not only was he loved, but he was also highly respected in the republic, and still is. People remember him very well, and they regret that he is not around anymore. Zyazikov, he has no authority. He is not respected by the people, and he cannot control the situation. For example, two of his close relatives were abducted, and he couldn’t protect them. He cannot protect even his own family. Zyazikov does not control federal secret services and does not have the capacity to protect the local police. It is not even a matter of controlling; it is the question of protecting the local police. Everybody is very unhappy with him, because unlike Aushev, he was not really elected in a fair manner and has no authority and no respect among the population.

Violence began during Zyazikov’s term:
On a related note, I would like to stress one more thing, regarding lawlessness and violence in Ingushetia. Abductions are a relatively new phenomenon in Ingushetia. They began taken place only after Zyazikov came to power, but were in the beginning limited to the Chechen refugee camps. Refugees were being abducted and taken back to Chechnya by the special forces. This started in 2002, but was conducted on a small scale. And by small scale I mean that 9 abductions were reported in 2002. However, over time, the number of disappearances in the Chechen refugee camps increased and the practice spread to the whole territory of Ingushetia. And now, Ingush are being abducted too, not on a regular basis, but increasingly so over last several years. There have been approximately 130 abductions of ethnic Ingush alone from 2002 until now.

In April 2004, local prosecutor wrote a report, and sent it to Moscow, claiming that local FSB stood behind the abductions. Soon thereafter, he himself disappeared. His father, a well connected judge, claims to have hard evidence pointing to the local FSB. Nevertheless, the case was never investigated.

 

Q: Do you see anything that the international community can do?

Musaeva: I guess, yes. The international community can watch the situation closely, put pressure on the prosecutor’s office to investigate all these violations and demonstrate to the authorities that it would not be so easy for them to just close off the republic and start a police operation in it. What we have today already is not a normal situation. There should already be pressure for thorough investigation that will show who the culprits are, what are their names, and how the investigation was conducted, etc. This has to start today. We should not be waiting for tomorrow.

Lokshina: International community needs to find Ingushetia on the map.
Everybody knows about Kadyrov’s stabilization in Chechnya, (although I would not describe what is going on there as a stabilization process). In any case, with the stabilization and ongoing reconstruction in Chechnya, many key players in the international community are ready to forget about the North Caucasus altogether. They see the progress in Chechnya and ignore Ingushetia. Because of its small size, Ingushetia is generally perceived as an appendix of Chechnya, without its own independent value.

 

Q: You mentioned possible worsening of the situation. Are the trends you spoke of specific to Ingushetia or are they threatening the entire region?

Lokshina: Dagestan is worrisome too; police there is being killed by dozens, disappearances take place, general public is discontented. It is easy enough to “explode” the situation there too. Dagestan is an enclave, and for the most part people there believe that the crimes are being perpetrated by the FSB – that should tell you how much trust in federal security services is there. I personally do not believe in it, but regardless, the situation is very explosive.

 

Q: Do you believe that the situation is created on purpose?

Musaeva: Let me tell you an example that we, human rights defenders, like to site. On July 22, 2004 there was a raid, by the rebels from Chechnya, in Ingushetia. They attacked at night and killed local police. It was horrible. It was Basayev’s operation, and even though they did not target the civilian population, many civilans died during the attack, including regular traffic police officers. Some of the young local Ingush men sided with the rebels during the incident, and then allegedly returned to normal life after the rebels left. There was never an objective investigation to establish whether this was indeed true. The general population was in a state of shock, humiliated, and extremely supportive of the security forces demanding that they find and punish those responsible. This happened in June of 2004. But when the investigation started, it was not an investigation per se – people were just grabbed off the streets. If one family member was suspected of involvement, six other young male relatives were detained as well – beaten and tortured together.

Lokshina: One of the rebels, who was caught and taken to the prison in Vladikavkaz, did not deny his involvement in the operation. However, he was tortured until he named 15 other people. Afterwards, he reported to human rights center Memorial, stating that although he did not deny his involvement he was coerced to name 15 people who had nothing to do with it and were innocent. As a result these 15 people were tortured as well. Three years have passed since then, and you can see how drastically the situation has changed. The FSB came to the region to fight terrorism and bring order, but for them there is no such thing as a peaceful Ingush, or peaceful Chechen, or a peaceful Caucasus resident. The power in Moscow untied their hands to do as they please here. On purpose or not -- I do not understand their mindset.

 

Q: Do you think the federal center understands that their actions increase the potential pool of recruits?

Lokshina: When we talk about the Russian authorities, it does not mean much, because they are not a monolithic thing. There are different tactics and different interests involved. But I can say for a fact, that nowadays everyone’s attention is focused on the presidential elections, and Caucasus is not on their priority list, so a lot of law enforcement agents and military personnel do whatever they want – and Moscow ignores this, and will continue to do so until a major outbreak happens.

Musaeva: It seams to me that it is a practice of the old Soviet tactic – crush everyone of a different opinion without discrimination or differentiation. This is the mindset that has persisted.

 

Q: Would you then say that what we are facing are simply remnants of Soviet mentality or is strong prejudice against Caucasian people an important factor? In other words, would the approach be the same if this was taking place in a non-Muslim republic outside of the Caucasus?

Lokshina: Well, the special security forces are particularly tainted with xenophobia. They do have very strong anti-Caucasian sentiments. But when we look at the policemen who went to Chechnya, we see that they commit the same types of violations against their Russian compatriots, when they return to their home regions. There were examples of mop-up operations, similar in style to the ones conducted in Chechnya, that took place in other regions of Russia, and are used against ethnic Russians (Blagoveshcensk, Tver region, Krasnodar region, etc). The notorious detention center in Blagoveschensk, where about a 1000 people were picked up in one day during the summer 2005. Hundreds of them were beaten and tortured. The police even organized a makeshift filtration camp. This had nothing to do with the Caucasus. Some of the police that perpetrate similar crimes outside of the Caucasus, had previous experiences in Chechnya.

Musaeva:
We expect help from the West:
And to add on the last note, after Chechnya, after what we had seen there, there is a hope that something can still be done in Ingushetia; That in the case of Ingushetia, the International community will step in. To be frank, we did not expect international community to do much about Chechnya. We did what we could ourselves. We understood the distribution of power. Now things are different and we are expecting and waiting for the international community to step in. It is a very important moment. And they can do something, if they wanted to. I was wondering why is it that the OSCE does not publish a report on terrorism prevention in the North Caucasus? Such a report should not be coming from human rights defenders, but from an organization that can bring some weight to the issue. Russia does not allow OSCE into region, but such a report can be prepared externally. Especially since it deals with a security concern on the territory of an OSCE member state. And the tone does not have to have an accusatory one. The report could simply reflect on the “preventive measures”.

 

Q: Do you think Russians would read something like this?

Lokshina: Definitely. Russians are not immune to criticism. They are antagonized by it. The problem is that the international community is playing very carefully with President Putin. The United States, given its preoccupation with its internal issues, has still not done anything to increase its leverage by working out a policy with its European counterparts with respect to the Russian Federation and the human rights issue. If US reacts at all, it does so sporadically. Same goes for the European Union. They have held a dialogue with the Russian Federation for three years, just for the sake of dialogue. The international community has to focus. They need to do something.

 

Statements of the interviewees are translated and in some cases paraphrased and summarized. Interview was conducted on October 28th, 2007 by Iva Savic, Head of the American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus at Freedom House